Why did Stalin have Tukhachevsky executed when he was by far the smartest Soviet general at the time...

Yeah, he was a rival for power
Party leadership was always wary of popular generals

“The Führer explained one more time the Tukhachevsky case and stated that we erred completely at the time when we thought that Stalin had ruined the Red Army. The opposite is true: Stalin got rid of all the opposition circles within the army and thereby succeeded in making sure that there would no longer be any defeatist currents within that army…

With respect to us, Stalin also has the advantage of not having any social opposition, since Bolshevism has eliminated it through the purges of the last twenty-five years…Bolshevism has eliminated this danger in time and can henceforth focus all of its strength on its enemy.”

– Joseph Göbbels, Tagebücher aus den Jahren 1942–1943, (Zurich, 1948), p. 322. Quoted in Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, La seconde guerre mondiale: caractères fondamentaux de la politique et de la stratégie, vol. 1, pp. 213–214.

Nah, that's just dumb grasping at straws, trying to explain why Wehrmacht is getting its shit wrecked.

Without the purges, two reorganizations of the army, and refusal to mobilize in the face of Barbarossa, Finland would've been part of USSR, and Germany would never have made it past… Kiev.

Until we invent time travel, there's no way to know for sure.
Equally possible that someone like Tukchachevsky would launch a coup in the most difficult days of the war, taking power for himself while ceding Ukraine, Belarus, and the Caucaus to Hitler.

Son, it's just a matter of mobilizing 1.3 million extra soldiers to the Eastern Front to match the Axis' 4 million, which could be done in six months. That way, already huge stockpiles, more than ten thousand tanks, to Wehrmacht's 5 thousand. of equipment wouldn't have been lost. The second the Nazis did not have a numerical advantage, they lost all ability to progress. The fascist Europe would've gotten shitstomped, along with Swedeshits and Frankoist scum.

youtube.com/watch?v=_7BE8CsM9ds

Who the FUCK *were* those guys and what the fuck did they know or do?

Is there anything to substantiate this bold claim?

That is unknown. Though, a certain germanophile tendency had been common in higher echelons of Red Army.

Again, what is this opinion based on?

Much more likely was for Red Army to collapse completely. There was a lot of evidence that "old cadre" of Red Army became lazy, corrupt, and incompetent. However, it was impossible to replace it in any significant quantities - they would've rallied together and presented united front against any initiative to replace them en masse.

I have gotten the impression through reading that Tukchachevsky was a true believer and not simply trying to accure power.

yeah, if only Soviets had more armchair generals like yourself the whole of Europe would've been red now
it's all so easy to predict the exact date of invasion and filter all the disinformation while sipping cofvefe in your armchair seventy years later
dude just like keep 4 millions troops constantly mobilized at all times lmao, easy peasy gimme dat order of hero of the soviet union

and as for the smartest general Tukhachevsky, his Polish campaign was pure delusional adventurism, soviet rear was in complete chaos

also apparently dude was a Holla Forums tier faggot, screeching about jews and all that
it is almost a pattern with russian imperial officers

I'd say there is a bit of over-dramatization, but not without merit.

Huge part of legitimacy modern Russian state has hinges on Communists being homicidally wrong (transition from USSR to modern Russia had been supported by absolutely hysterical "revelations" - most of which had been proven utterly false today). The biggest "proof" of this "wrongness" is 1937/38 - a fact that centralized power of the state coincided with the supposedly irrational mass executions. From this it is deduced that centralized power of the state inevitably leads to purges for no good reason, and corrupt liberal government (together with obviously unfair distribution of economic power among the private individuals) becomes justified as best possible.

Should the 1937/38 become an attempt of certain ranks of Soviet regime to enact counter-revolution - and government launching counter-offensive, the purges become justified. Now it's not paranoid dictator murdering people left and right, but a government resolving to do what it must (pre-emptively start an effective Civil War) to protect the nation - a thing no liberal government could've done due to inherent weakness. I.e. unpleasant but safe Capitalism becomes both unpleasant and unsafe.

I'm not sure if this will be enough for new Revolution, but Capitalists losing their biggest bogeyman would mean a significant shit of Russia leftward.

What were you reading?

> shift

Jesus, what an edgelord, somebody read too much Nietzsche.

along with Svechin, he came up with the deep operations theory that the Soviets used during WW2, and was a big proponent of mechanised warfare compared to others at the time, still stuck in pre-WW1 notions of warfare

If he really believed that, why didn't he join the Whites? he supported the Bolsheviks from 1917 and defeated Denikin and Wrangel

Basis was created during Civil War (practical; Budyonny's First Cavalry Army), then throughout 1920s - primarily by Triandafillov who was the one to introduce the idea to the high command which then popularized it in 1931-33. Theory had been put into practice in 1939 (Khalkhin Gol).

I don't really see here anything groundbreaking here that was contributed by Tukhachevsky.

Ten years of executions by firing squad.

Due to obsession of Soviet officers with mechanization, Soviet logistics sucked balls in 1941 - for years horses were deemed obsolete and were sold or slaughtered, while the army waited for fancy trucks - of which there wasn't enough. This is one of the main reasons why already slow Red Army was nigh paralyzed in the first months of war. On the other hand, Wehrmacht wasn't run by retarded fashionistas and used horses extensively. Despite being more mechanized, it also had almost double the horses (~6,000 horses per ~20k of soldiers) - as compared to horses Red Army had on paper (~3,000 horses per ~15k soldiers). IRL it was worse.

If not for those "stuck in pre-WW1 notions of warfare" (Luddite Budyonny, who was the one to pioneer those deep operations) Red Army would've had even less horses.

This question should be directed not to lowly lieutenant, but to majority of Tsarist generals (not to mention middle and low-ranking officers) - who actively served Bolsheviks.

The answer is simple: "Whites" never existed. Not really.

West likes to present situation as Civil War (implying some ambiguity in the situation), while much more apt description was given by the locals - Foreign Intervention. It begun with 14 Capitalist nations (17, if you include Central Powers, who were de facto allied with them - treaty demanded from them to resist Bolsheviks and cede their territory only to Allies) launching an invasion into Russia and being supported by Czechoslovak legion (which was technically French army). Whatever Bourgeois historians like to say, this was the core of White movement in 1918. Everything else was on the level of large gangs. While White movement grew (attracting all kinds of stragglers), it never truly existed as a "side". The only unifying force that kept everything together was the Allied command, that directed and supplied Whites.

Modern analogy of "Civil" War in Russia would be Libya. Which is why actual army officers - while having little to no love towards Bolsheviks - simply did not consider joining Whites - everyone knew they were a bunch of mercenaries and opportunists. Even decision to sit it out was borderline dishonourable.

P.s. AFAIK Tukhachevsky joined Bolsheviks in 1918, not 1917

They had already been working with Germany beforehand, so it would not be much of a shocker; covert military cooperation benefited both countries. Not even much of a point against him either; it was not a given in the twenties and thirties that Germany and the Soviet Union would clash. Now if he was actually working a German asset and a coup plotter, that's a different story.

!!!
The biggest tank battle ever fought was actually in 1941, and if you look at the Soviet losses due to vehicles breaking down, running out of fuel, etc. and not being recovered, it just makes you want to cry. It's amazing how these defects in their support network never got noticed when they did large exercises.

This, it was more along the lines of a series of independent warlords and generals being the whites though the Libya description is spot on.

It’s not propaganda, there were men who were in the red army that will confirm fucked up shit like that happened. Just like there were men who served in the SS that can confirm the death camps.

Wasn't it Kursk? Even 1984-pedia claims that it was ~5,000 tanks in Moscow and ~8,000 in Kursk.

Some research (by Smirnov, on Kiev/Belarus field exercises in 1935/36) suggests that there was no real large exercises. All major were done with no intent to root out any potential problems. Instead, each and every effort was spent to make everything look good: new roads and bridges were built to accommodate proper transportation, routes across swamps and rivers were scouted beforehand, there was no independent actions - instead every action was scripted: scenario that has to be followed with exact timing was delivered to officers one week prior and was often discussed by commanders from both sides jointly, troops were drilled only on what they were expected to do during the exercise, and so on, and so forth.

I'm not entirely persuaded that everything was as bad as he claims, but there clearly was a lot of finagling going on - which in no small part contributes to the position that majority of old Red Commanders grew conceited and corrupt (and never really were Bolsheviks - three months of service in Red Army during Civil War was considered sufficient to become member of the Party).

He was a closet Nazi, and had privately supported allying with Hitler and moving toward a NutSac model.

Name me a battle under Tukhachevsky in which human wave tactics occurred.

The basis for the theory of operational art and deep operations both is a dual project of Triandafillov and Tukhachevsky, the former in its theory and the latter in its construction in the reorganization of the Soviet military in 1935/1936.
Budyonny was indeed a part of its conception, as in his egregious failure in the push to Lvov rather than the re-encircling of retreating Polish troops on Tukhachevsky's western front effectively prefaced the massive failure of the 'March on the Vistula', so yes, I suppose he was a reason for its nascent development at the military-scientific society of the RKKA.
No, not even close. Following the purges, the majority of the theory was excised from the field operations manuals, minus pieces of maskirovka, and it most definitely was not present at Khalkhin Gol

Here, one must be ignorant or otherwise disposed to ignorance to ignore the applications for operational range and infrastructure made by Tukhachevksy, whose mediation insured the technical supervision and development of the professional Red Army, which was consistently hampered by Stalin in attempts to assert formal centralism of the military. Beginning in 1926, with the technical expertise of German military engineers in the reshuffling and modernization of the Air Force, the connection to the German state body would be what did him in after so many previous attempts to denounce him (ironically playing into the hands of the SS, where Heydrich was trying to marginalize the Abwehr; the NKVD, where Yezhov and later Beria, under direction from Stalin, were also """marginalizing""" their own military logistics and organizational bodies). So, murdering the whole of the body for mechanization and construction of infrastructure ended up having adverse effects on the process, which were mitigated by the predisposition of Budyonny for the use of traditional cavalry and Echelon patterns - given the military context, this is not an operational success or a viable strategy, as the only valuable contribution of the clique outside of the military body for reorganization and modernization, was also one from Triandafillov and Tukhachevsky; the shifting of military infrastructure and industry to the East where, supplemented by mechanized or motorized transit, operational range can be effectively maintained and resupplied while secure against attack.
in 1917

Depending on which Smirnov (there were quite a few within the military apparatus), this could actually be a critique of the parade and pomp orchestrated by the state for propaganda or to dissuade foreign interlopers. Anyways, using it as a correlation to the "conceit and corrupt" nature of the new command of the RKKA is spurious, at best. The comment on Bolshevik party membership is a moot point, in light of the considerable dissident streak the Tsarist army had in the months leading up to the October revolution - so I think it merits more study than simply to declare time the measure of a Bolshevik).

No

Were there any high profile cases of Tsarist generals and officers joining the bolsheviks or switching sides during the civil war? I've been told that the SU after the war had a lot of personnel from the secret police and top brass of the former regime but can never seem to find any actual names.

A lot of the lower ranking officers in the Tsarist military became disenchanted with the war and were a huge part of organized discontent within the Imperial Army, the Okhrana not really much at all.

In that case, one must be very careful in discerning prejudices given that a great number of former-imperial officers served with distinction as dedicated communists, as well as helped enumerate a whole new system of military organization and development. Especially in the aftermath of the defeat in Poland on the Vistula, the commentaries on the loss - political and military - were an excellent indicator of the composed thoughtfulness of theory and its ubiquitous nature in the armed forces, connecting from the revolutionary high command all the way to Lenin, a collective project of reflection and analysis of mistakes and misassumptions was a sign of fervor and tempered determination. To mistake a great number of the officers as merely opportunist militarists was to deny the revolutionary military its class character and authenticity within the historical record

...

Why is it at all costs?
Why not just surround them and starve them out?

This is a hypothetical scenario, but maybe that hill will facilitate overwatch of a route through which you want to send troops, and you must capture that hill to advance.

Because combat is time-sensitive. If you give the enemy time to regroup and rearm, they'll come and lift your retarded siege and fuck you up the ass. Dictating tempo is critical. If you start dancing and reacting to your enemy, you're going to lose.

Okay. You are officially talking out of your ass.

The one who is a candidate of historical sciences and professor of the Moscow architectural Institute.

You invent supposed arguments and then refute it. Did I miss something or shall we just call it "strawman" and move on?

Hundreds.

No.

Yes.

How many do you want?

For example: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aleksandr_Nemits
Before October: Rear Admiral, replaced Kolchak as a commander of Black Sea Fleet
After October: managed to get sentenced to death for treason by Bolsheviks, got acquitted. Joined Red Navy in 1918, served until 1947 (promoted to Vice Admiral), died in 1967.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nikolai_Danilov
Before October: General of the Infantry, commander of the 2nd Army (included I, VI, XIII, XV and XXIII army corps).
After October: Joined Red Army as an instructor. Became professor of military academy, then inspector of the Soviet High Command. Retired in 1933, died in 1934.

The preface to the 1994 edition of Triandafillov' "The Nature of the Operation of Modern Armies" + you can read it on the fucking wiki page for deep operations, unless you'd like me to link the actual 1939 field manual so you can see just how much of the military-scientific societies consensus remained after >50% were excised from the military.

Was not aware of this person

My only argument to be made is that the characterization of a number of the revolutionary veterans as conceited and corrupt is dubious. Being that the example provided by Smirnov could be an equal denunciation of the MO of the state. I've no other argument to be made

I know, I'm sorry! I didn't mean for that to come off as accusatory, merely as a pre-emptive rebuke of a common reading of the transitions of the officers. That's my fault, I wasn't being clear!

I wasn't claiming that the officers who joined the bolsheviks were opportunists of any kind, if they were they would have formed or joined one of the many warlord armies of the conflict. I have been told however that a huge portion of the red army's commanders were composed of czarist officers, but clearly that had no effect on their dedication or class character.

I've been looking at statistics on officer personnel that lacked actual people. It's good to finally have a tangible person as an example, did any of these guys write memoirs or anything? Their wiki pages are pretty small.

Assuming that was a reply to my post on the transitioning officers, now worries! I also had to change my own reply to make sure there were no unintended implications.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_Liskow

...

Read what? Would you mind explaining coherently what are you trying to prove?

Are you per chance trying to argue that Khalkhin Gol was not an example of "deep battle"?

I'm certain they did. But not in English.

> warn the Red Army of imminent attack the next morning.
> Son, it's just a matter of mobilizing 1.3 million extra soldiers to the Eastern Front to match the Axis' 4 million, which could be done in six months.

Military genius of Holla Forums never ceases to amaze me.

I'm getting real tired of your dipshittery. Read a history book.

grover furr is good, in general. still, the evidence on tukhachevsky needs a proper examination.

The level of massing German units did not include any Panzer units until just before the invasion. This was seen as defensive posture.
Furthermore, they did shoot down German planes over soviet airspace. This is how they got the plans for Barbarossa.
Thirdly, Stalin was warned of invasions being on and called off all the time in the months leading up to the invasion. Only in retrospect could we know which one was real and which weren't.
Finally, the Red Army was mobilized in a limited defensive posture because they had always expected to invade. Stalin knew that the USSR wasn't ready for war and so tried diplomacy. It is you that needs to read a history book because it's clear as fuck that you don't know shit about Soviet military history.

U

WOT

M8

Red Army was under strict orders not to provoke the Germans. Read official documents.

22june.mil.ru/

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Soviet_war_documents_declassification

Yes, that is it. Up until engagements in the second world war, Deep Battle was not practiced

/thread

That doesn't mean airspace violators wouldn't be shot down or escorted out. The order not to provoke was literally right up until the invasion because Stalin did not want to start a war if he didn't have to. They were told to be ready but avoid provoking so as to not make it look like the soviets started the war. Are you stupid?

First and foremost, what does anything have to do with Stalin? He wasn't in charge of the military. He practically had to execute a coup after Reich invaded to be able to influence military (formation of State Defence Committee) - they blatantly told him to fuck off, when he started demanding to know why the orders of government are ignored (29th June).

Secondly, Soviets were constantly warned since before 1939 of the "impending attacks" from all sides. Go learn how intelligence services work - they are always flooded with disinformation.

Preparation begun as early as 18th June.

Specific timeline on the 22th June:
01.05 - Moscow sends the order to immediately prepare for the invasion (so-called "Directive #1")
02.30 - confirmation on the order being received everywhere
03.10 - Lviv sends to Moscow information from Liskow

Okay, I attempted to read one.

> en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Soviet_war_documents_declassification
This is hilarious.

IRL Ivanov writes that he was surprised by carelessness that reigned in Kiev - to where he was assigned from Transbaikal region (where preparation were serious, despite being far from front-line; Ivanov even refers to the reports he was receiving there about concentration of German troops as early as May 4th). However, he was repeatedly told by locals in Kiev that there will be no war and specifically repeats that it was commander who forbade to put troops on high alert - or respond to the attack, since war was impossible

Furthermore, when the evening of June 21st came, despite explicit orders from Moscow to stay on high alert and for all commanders to be in HQ, on phone stations - commander forbade to do anything, and officers weren't in contact with anyone (nobody bothered to have phone stations working).

Such Stalin, much wow.

Now, prepare for Twilight Zone. Commander of Kiev Military District Ivanov was writing about was Kirponos.

1984-pedia:
> On the night of 21 June 1941, the day before the launch of Operation Barbarossa by the Wehrmacht, Mikhail Kirponos disregarded the strict instruction from Stavka to ignore rumors of the pending invasion the next day and spent the night preparing mission orders for his command. …
> While his front-line units were under the Stavka's general order to treat any German attack as a likely provocation, and not to return fire, just as all other front line units of the Soviet armies of the frontier had been instructed, the armies of the Southwestern Front were alert, and had not been completely stood down. It is possibly because of this wary attitude of Kirponos and his staff that the Southwestern Front was not caught completely flat footed when the Germans attacked.
No sources given, obviously.

> Afterwards, Kirponos' forces fought in the Battle of Kiev. He was killed in action during the defense of Kiev, in which the Soviets ended up losing badly due to the overwhelming advantage by the Germans, which was exacerbated by the grave errors of Joseph Stalin and the high-ranking military leaders.
By the way, according to memoirs of Chernov (who retells story told to him by Glebov in 1968 - long after Stalin was dead) Kirponos had a discussion with Stalin after Kiev came under threat of being surrounded. Tupikov (Chief of Staff) directly contacted Stalin - over Kirponos' head - with demands to immediately order retreat (September 13th) and next day Stain had a talk Kirponos. Kirponos succeeded in persuading him that Tupikov is just panicking and there is no need to retreat.

1984-pedia:

Well, you are wrong. And I don't really care about wiki, if there is any doubt.

you are all very funny
all you need to do is look at the battle accounts by both sides,
where germans with their equipment were pretty much winning most battles all the way up to winter with like half of the losses

do not excuse fuckups by either side