Purges of the Officers Corps

For what possible productive reason could a major purge, execution or otherwise, exist for such a great number of the officers of the Red Army, who composed a major percentage of organizational personnel who oversaw and managed military infrastructure and logistics. This is not meant as a typical, elliptical means of critique against the nomenklatura or political corpus of the CPSU, but rather as a inquiry into how the political body (in the guise of the security apparatus) subsumed what functioned as a substantial independent bulwark against not only fascism but domestic sabotage. The latent effects it would have on the initial phase of the Soviet-German war were catastrophic merely from a strategy-tactics standpoint.

Are there any redeeming qualities to this legacy of calamitous political-military intrigue?

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general Vlasov is an obvious example

also I find it funny that criers of purged military officer corps have Tuchachevsky as their martyr
dude was salty at Stalin for his massive failure in the Polish war
and his supposed invention of the theory of deep operations is, wait for it, supposed
plus theory of deep operations was at the core of the soviet military doctrine even after the purge
see Khalkhin Gol

And ironically he wasn’t purged, and he went on to collaborate with the Germans. Meanwhile all the officers who served loyally in the Civil War were.

you're assuming too much
as I see it, purges were the reason there was only one Vlasov

never trust an Army officers corps
I thought commies would understand this maxima better than anyone

wrong question. fucker was a paranoid lunatic.

Literally every serious historian that has studied Stalin say he was not crazy

If you know literally anything about revolutions, especially ones created around or just after a conflict, the answer should be obvious. "The revolution eats its own children" is more than some poetic platitude; it is the duty of all involved to recognize that oneself belongs to the revolution, this includes acknowledging the possibility that, yes, you yourself may be subject to the same fist you held over others. Robespierre knew this, Stalin and Lenin knew this, and all those purged, rightfully or not, should have known this.

"The revolutionary is a doomed man." - Nechayev

t. Lenin

How does this justify killing thousands out of mere suspicion and personal feud?

Yezhov was a wrecker who went too far.

That's the secret. It doesn't. The user you're replying to is a brainlet if that's truly the sort of connection he would make of this.

Officer corps did get purged, but only 7% were actually executed. The USSR in 1941 would've been in deep shit with or without them


They were plotting to overthrow Stalin and align with the Nazis.

Tukhachevsky had advocated allying with the Nazis many times. He could not be trusted, and nor could those he colluded with.



Tukhachevsky was just the major face behind the modernization of the soviet military, which, post-1926, included technical services for the air forces from the Weimar Republic. Triandafillov was the progenitor of the ideas behind deep operations, which ended up, along with miskirovka, as fundamental pillars of the strategic arsenal of the Soviet military as it developed from a revolutionary partisan group to a professional army - no one is attempting to say that in removing Tuk that deep operations were scrapped.
Yes, he was, but not in the manner of decrying military incompetence. He had wrote that if the Vistula had fallen, communism would have swept across the whole of Europe. Instead, Stalin lost the strategic initiative in his hesitance to reinforce Trotsky.

This could be understandable from the POV of them being able to possibly act to undermine the centrality of power in a state, but given that the composition of the corps was entirely communist as well as an essential part of the development of both military and civilian infrastructure and tech - the fact that Stalin viewed them with ire and suspicion, belies the fact that this was little more than a consolidation of military authority

Usually one makes reference to this in the universal hopelessness sense, as in Lenin (who didn't live to see the establishment of the full Union), not like Stalin (who became the unassailable, but paranoiac visage of the people). You're absolutely right on the consciousness being that of a necessary martyr, with no illusory additions or imagistic heroism, but in that way - all the more - Stalin becomes a figure of detraction from communist thought.

This, quite literally, is nazi propaganda. The SS, under Heydrich, worked to debilitate the officer corps by implicating a number of generals and then the whole of the body as collaborators or Trotskyists, this was corroborated through the Soviet' French embassy to Moscow. Besides this, there was very little to implicate collusion minus the brief work with German technical advisors in the modernization period, after 1926. The signatures were faked, the papers were forged, fallacious plots were concocted. The NKVD, being one of the most capable and consistently effective intelligence services, domestic and abroad, was able to detect all these goings on - the passage of info from the SS, implicating collusion with German generals in the SD - and yet the one thing they "forgot" to check was the AUTHENTICITY of the evidence. No, I don't buy it. This proceeds into a trial lasting just about a week, culminating in the execution of 8 of the most capable executors of the military corpus. Their investigators then, too, are arrested and executed, like Blyukher.
no, he didn't. He was a staunch communist, and outside of technical logistics was never intimately
involved in the German-Soviet technical exchange.


also this

Two great videos thanks lads


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