Tukhachevsky was just the major face behind the modernization of the soviet military, which, post-1926, included technical services for the air forces from the Weimar Republic. Triandafillov was the progenitor of the ideas behind deep operations, which ended up, along with miskirovka, as fundamental pillars of the strategic arsenal of the Soviet military as it developed from a revolutionary partisan group to a professional army - no one is attempting to say that in removing Tuk that deep operations were scrapped.
Yes, he was, but not in the manner of decrying military incompetence. He had wrote that if the Vistula had fallen, communism would have swept across the whole of Europe. Instead, Stalin lost the strategic initiative in his hesitance to reinforce Trotsky.
This could be understandable from the POV of them being able to possibly act to undermine the centrality of power in a state, but given that the composition of the corps was entirely communist as well as an essential part of the development of both military and civilian infrastructure and tech - the fact that Stalin viewed them with ire and suspicion, belies the fact that this was little more than a consolidation of military authority
Usually one makes reference to this in the universal hopelessness sense, as in Lenin (who didn't live to see the establishment of the full Union), not like Stalin (who became the unassailable, but paranoiac visage of the people). You're absolutely right on the consciousness being that of a necessary martyr, with no illusory additions or imagistic heroism, but in that way - all the more - Stalin becomes a figure of detraction from communist thought.
This, quite literally, is nazi propaganda. The SS, under Heydrich, worked to debilitate the officer corps by implicating a number of generals and then the whole of the body as collaborators or Trotskyists, this was corroborated through the Soviet' French embassy to Moscow. Besides this, there was very little to implicate collusion minus the brief work with German technical advisors in the modernization period, after 1926. The signatures were faked, the papers were forged, fallacious plots were concocted. The NKVD, being one of the most capable and consistently effective intelligence services, domestic and abroad, was able to detect all these goings on - the passage of info from the SS, implicating collusion with German generals in the SD - and yet the one thing they "forgot" to check was the AUTHENTICITY of the evidence. No, I don't buy it. This proceeds into a trial lasting just about a week, culminating in the execution of 8 of the most capable executors of the military corpus. Their investigators then, too, are arrested and executed, like Blyukher.
no, he didn't. He was a staunch communist, and outside of technical logistics was never intimately
involved in the German-Soviet technical exchange.
