Certainly its objective development can be identified with the process of scientific development, but not with any specific empirical claim made within science.
It depends on how you treat empiricism. If you treat empirical claims as absolute claims, it would be anti-dialectical. Whether it's "inherently" so, however, depends on whether you're an empiricist. Viewing falsifiability as the major criterion for scientific development does seem empiricist, though.
No, but one would think Popper himself would be about his own views which you're repeating.
It does occur semi-frequently that the model is shown to be "wrong" by an experiment, but, if the experiment is strongly at odds with major aspects of the model regarded as true beforehand, it's usually regarded as an error in measurement or an experimental design flaw unless the result is replicated (and continuously so). It isn't merely that the model has been falsified but is demonstrated continuously to be false as it begins to lack in predictive power for the experiments that are continuously demonstrating it to be false.
Some scientific results are also not truly subject to being falsified by people on the outside (i.e. those who weren't party to those results testing with different instruments than the original experiment) because of the time, money, and expertise required to run such experiments (experiments at the LHC can and have been run many times at the LHC, but there is no comparable facility for many of their experiments that would be able to demonstrate absolutely that it isn't some aspect of the LHC's particular design itself creating the results).
This doesn't demonstrate that a given person is behaving in certain definite ways regardless of socialization. You're describing a social process that partly acts upon and is partly a function of the biological.
I never said they were irrelevant. I was stating something rather different: that the biological facts are only made into "gender" as a result of how these facts are seen by society. It isn't that this societal view of the facts has absolutely nothing to do with the biology (there is definitely a relationship between the two), but, instead, the constructions place the biological facts within society by attributing those biological tendencies toward certain behaviors, attitudes, etc. within society to "gender" which gives all of those meanings adhering in the term that are only vaguely related to what underlies "gender" biologically (which isn't itself "gender" and may have little to do with "gender").
I wasn't unaware, although the infamous "giraffe extending its neck because it wants to eat leaves" example is more what I was thinking with regards to the phrasing before.
I wasn't ignoring science but attempting to place science as limited by the expressions it must make as being determinate and empirical. Again, that isn't to say that science should necessarily be something else, although it should probably acknowledge these limitations better in certain cases, particularly when pertaining to cases like the interactions of our subjective notions of selfhood and personality and identifying our human notions of those completely with certain biological traits and the brain.