>Strictly in respect to theory, therefore, one can and must speak openly of Marx’s theoretical anti-humanism, and see in this theoretical anti-humanism the absolute (negative) precondition of the (positive) knowledge of the human world itself, and of its practical transformation.
t. Althusser
Quoted from: Marxism and Humanism
marxists.org
>Back in the 1960s, the era of structuralism, Louis Althusser launched the notorious formula of "theoretical antihumanism," allowing, demanding even, that it be supplemented by practical humanism. In our practice, we should act as humanists, respecting the others, treating them as free persons with full dignity, creators of their world. However, in theory, we should no less always bear in mind that humanism is an ideology, the way we spontaneously experience our predicament, and that the true knowledge of humans and their history should treat individuals not as autonomous subjects, but as elements in a structure which follows its own laws. In contrast to Althusser, Lacan accomplishes the passage from theoretical to practical anti-humanism, i.e., to an ethics that goes beyond the dimension of what Nietzsche called "human, all too human," and confront the inhuman core of humanity. This does not mean only an ethics which no longer denies, but fearlessly takes into account, the latent monstrosity of being-human, the diabolic dimension which exploded in phenomena usually covered by the concept-name "Auschwitz" - an ethics that would be still possible after Auschwitz, to paraphrase Adorno. This inhuman dimension is for Lacan at the same time the ultimate support of ethics - as we shall see in the last chapter, therein resides the ultimate wager of Lacan's "ethics of psychoanalysis.
t. Zizek
Quoted from: Badiou: Notes from an Ongoing Debate
>[…] This is also one of the ways of specifying the meaning of Lacan’s claim that the subject is always “decentered.” His point is not that my subjective experience is regulated by objective unconscious mechanisms that are decentered with regard to my self-experience and, as such, beyond my control (a point asserted by every materialist), but, rather, something much more unsettling: I am deprived of even my most intimate subjective experience, the way things “really seem to me,” that of the fundamental fantasy that constitutes and guarantees the core of my being, since I can never consciously experience it and assume it.
>[…] In other words, psychoanalysis allows us to formulate a paradoxical phenomenology without a subject – phenomena arise which are not phenomena of a subject, appearing to a subject. This does not mean that the subject is not involved here – it is, but, precisely, in the mode of exclusion, as divided, as the agency which is not able to assume the very core of his or her inner experience.
t. Zizek
''Quoted from: From Che Vuoi? to Fantasy;
Lacan with Eyes Wide Shut''