They warn of an alleged rise in "Russophobia" in Belarus, and criticise the West for plotting to tear the country away from Russia. The last such attack took place in late 2014 but then faded as the Belarusian presidential elections approached.
With Russia's economy in trouble and the regime of President Alexander Lukashenka seeking rapprochement with the West, Kremlin pressure on Belarus may increase.
Rather aggressive articles targeting Belarus have once again appeared on various Russian online media portals over the past few weeks: Lenta.ru, an influential, state-controlled online outlet;Sputnik i Pogrom, the well-known nationalistic website; and Pravda, the once-powerful communist newspaper - to name just a few.
All texts contain a near-identical set of messages, indicating that they are part of a coordinated media campaign. As is usual, they all criticise the promotion of Belarusian traditions, language and culture in Belarus, and accuse Lukashenka's regime of being tolerant of "Nazis" and '"Russophobes".
"Until recently, Belarusian nationalists were perceived as marginal and were represented in society by a small layer of radical youth and intelligentsia" - writes Lenta.ru in reference to the Belarusian volunteers fighting in Ukraine. "However, the war in Donbass has changed everything. (…) The influence of youth [nationalistic extremist] organisations in Belarus is growing exponentially"
Belarusian nationalists over the last year “not only have come out of ‘the political ghetto’ into which they have been since the end of the 1990s but also have become an influential political force” in Minsk, indeed a force that even Alyaksandr Lukashenka has had to take into consideration and play up to.
As Lukashenka visited Kyiv and restated his support for Ukraine, a Congress in Defense of the Independence of Belarus met in Minsk and declared that it hadsucceeded in gathering a million signatures on a petition in support of that goal, something its organizers said showed the vitality of Belarusian nationalism.
The group said that it saw the main threat to the independence of Belarus not so much in Russia but rather in the Eurasian Economic Union which is supposed to begin operation on January 1, a distinction that may have made it easier for the organizers to hold their meeting and to gather support in the population.
In a week in which much has occurred of geopolitical importance, the evolution of the domestic political situation in Belarus has not received as much attention as it should have. Belarus isn't usually high on the list of countries the average American watches in terms of international news. Recent events there, however, provide good reason to give the country some attention. Public protests against the regime of Alexander Lukashenka that began in mid February in response to a tax on those employed for less than half of a year have grown and morphed into a demand for systemic political change, and have thus set up a showdown with a regime not accustomed to challenge, while stoking fears in the Kremlin that it may be facing another “color revolution” on its border, potentially triggering a muscular Russian response.
Outside observers could be forgiven for not seeing change in the wind in Belarus, where on the surface everything looked the same. Change has, nevertheless, been coming, even to the country commonly referred to as “the last dictatorship of Europe”, spurred by the Ukraine crisis, which set in motion a series of changes in Lukashenka's approach both to the West and to Putin, which changes have been working themselves out gradually since. Fearing that the West could support a Maidan-type uprising against him, and also needing Western investment to spur economic growth in an economy (overly dependent upon an imploding Russian economy) in recession, Lukashenka offered to mediate between Russia and the West in the ongoing confrontation over Ukraine. Putin's annexation of Crimea and stoking of conflict in eastern Ukraine also brought home to Lukashenka the danger that Russia could undertake similar actions in Belarus should it believe its interests there to be threatened. He therefore began a sustained effort to warm ties with the West while maintaining his security ties and strategic alignment with Moscow, whose support he needs in order to maintain his rule.
Evan Martinez
With an eye on Western opinion Lukashenka has allowed a limited number of small, unsanctioned protests, such as those last year that accompanied the debate over whether Russia would be allowed an air base on Belarusian territory (Minsk was able to dodge that demand on Putin's part by agreeing to purchase new Russian warplanes for the Belarusian military, which would then be used as part of the Single Air Defense System, and by agreeing to participate in an Integrated Regional Antiaircraft Defense System). He has also released several prominent political prisoners over the past year in a nod to the West. On March 1, 2016, as part of his attempt to continue to warm relations with the EU, the Belarusian interior ministry announced a softer stance on protests – it would no longer detain protestors, but that police would file charges and protestors would be forced to appear in court and pay a fine, but no longer serve jail time. This change, as much as anything else, set the stage for the events of the past month that have the potential to reshape both Belarusian domestic politics as well as its foreign policy.
More recently, Lukashenka has made other moves favorable to the West that have raised Moscow's ire, including the liberalization of its visa requirements for more than 80 countries, including the United States and countries in the EU. In response to this move Russia installed border controls with Belarus – which border is supposed to be “open”, which resulted in Lukashenka accusing Moscow of “violating treaties”. Russian displeasure with the new visa regime announced by Minsk was so hot that the editors of a leading Belarusian opposition news source believed Putin had made a decision to depose Lukashenka.
Since the beginning of the year an increasingly vituperative rift between Minsk and Moscow has grown, one largely rooted in a tug of war between the two over Belarus' flirtation with the West and Moscow's fear that it could lose Belarus as it has Ukraine. Although that fear would previously have seemed farfetched, the evolution of the political protests, and the government response to them, make them appear less so. Russian media has provided indications that Moscow sees the trajectory in Belarus as paralleling that of Ukraine several years ago, with Russian media blaming Lukashenka's flirtation with the West for current events, as well as suspecting the hidden hand of the West. Belarus's strategic value to Russia being on a par with that of Ukraine, the departure of Minsk from that orbit would be a strategic disaster, particularly following close on the heels of the alienation that has occurred between Russia and Ukraine. This would open the door to potentially aggressive moves on Putin's part to keep Belarus in the Russian fold should events be deemed to be getting out of hand.
Noah Gonzalez
To sum it up Russia has been trying to integrate Belarus into the Eurasian union the same way they tried the Ukraine and slavs dont want none of that gay shit
Brayden Jones
Good for them.
Yep.
Xavier Hill
Belarus also has great folk metal/ rock
Benjamin Johnson
It's interesting seeing the nations on Russia's European periphery resisting the Asiatic partners Russia is linking up with. It's clear that's what is going on here.
Parker Lopez
Sounds like an opportunity for the shitskins currently flocking into Russia to infect Eastern Europe. Bravo to the Belarussians for resisting that shit. Eastern countries really are between a rock and a hardplace.
Adam Parker
Could this be it? The return of Intermarium?
Russia is probably about to invade Belarus, because muh ethnic russians
