Bin über einen etwas älteren Artikel gestolperlt, ich poste den mal einfach dreist
====
Thinking the unthinkable on Germany going nuclear
The security debate is changing with calls for country to pull its weight militarily
In about 10 days’ time the elite of the US and European defence and diplomatic establishment will gather in Bavaria for the annual Munich Security Conference. Sometimes it is an occasion for high diplomatic drama; other times a chin-stroking gabfest. This year, one senses there will be quite a lot to talk about.
At a time when many of the old certainties have been overturned, few questions seem inappropriate. So in that spirit, I have one for those gathering in Munich to consider: is it time for Germany to go nuclear?
Simply entertaining the thought might seem grossly irresponsible. The world, surely, has quite enough nuclear powers already. Also, history makes Germany an unlikely candidate to join the club — even if a fair number of the pioneers of the original atomic bomb were German émigrés, thus making the country sort-of present at the creation of mass destruction.
German defence policy has long been characterised by restraint — sometimes to the frustration of its allies — and is obliged by international treaty not to take up nuclear arms. This makes it all the more remarkable that the nuclear option is being countenanced in Berlin, as part of a wider discussion about how Germany might need to reposition itself in a fast-changing geopolitical environment — one in which talk of a break up of the “supranational” EU or the “obsolescence” of Nato is almost routine.
The spark for the nuclear part of this discussion was provided by the election of Donald Trump. A few days ahead of the US presidential vote, an article in Spiegel Online asked whether, with the election of an American administration that mayno longer care so much for Europe or Nato, Germany might need to pursue its own, or a European, nuclear deterrent.
This was later echoed by Roderich Kiesewetter, a foreign policy spokesman in parliament for the ruling Christian Democrats and a former colonel. He told Reuters that if the US no longer wanted to provide a nuclear shield, then “Europe still needs nuclear protection for deterrent purposes”. A subsequent opinion piece by one of the publishers of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Germany’s conservative paper of record, made a similar case and suggested that it was time the country reconsidered things long deemed “unthinkable”.
It did not take long for the think-tank community and commentariat to weigh in. Some saw such views as the logical consequence of developments that could see Germany left vulnerable in an increasingly dangerous neighbourhood, with a newly expansionist Russia flexing its muscles to the east. Others maintained that it was reckless even to entertain such thoughts.
Almost all observers have been quick to note that there is almost zero public support in Germany for nuclear weapons. Even those who have raised the issue acknowledge this. Mr Kiesewetter says that Europe does not need another nuclear power. He has talked instead about a European nuclear “umbrella” provided by the continent’s existing atomic powers, France and the UK, and possibly part-financed by Germany.
Other analysts note that Germany’s more immediate defence requirements may lie in the area of trade, where the new US administration has identified Berlin as the miscreant in a system supposedly manipulated to America’s detriment.
Yet the very fact that this is being discussed at all is a further indication of how the German security debate is changing. Calls for Europe’s biggest economy to pull its weight more militarily have been a feature of western defence discourse for years. Germany has responded, albeit cautiously. Past taboos about overseas deployments have been overcome. Defence spending is due to rise, and the need to modernise the armed forces is widely recognised.
Now added to this are the disruptive changes threatened by Brexit, the rise of populism and the election of Mr Trump. In an extreme case, these could sever the moorings of postwar German foreign and security policy in Europe and the western defence system. In that context, thinking the unthinkable becomes more imaginable.
ft.com/content/277695dc-ec52-11e6-ba01-119a44939bb6
archive.is/XLbBc
